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Abstract
The last two volumes of Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer series are concerned
with developing a theory of use. This article offers a critical assessment of the
two concepts, use and form-of-life, that form the heart of this theory: how do
these two notions offer a solution to the problem of bare life that forms the core
of the Homo Sacer series? First, the author describes how the original problem of
bare life is taken up in The Use of Bodies and how the notion of use offers an
important additional characteristic of bare life. Second, inspired by Foucault’s analysis
of ancient Cynicism, the author discusses in which sense the type of ‘solution’
Agamben offers to the problem of bare life might be seen as an heir to ancient
Cynicism and how this interpretation clarifies his connection of form-of-life and
exile. Third, the author critically assesses the different usages of use that we can
find in Agamben, by comparing how Franciscan usus, Pauline chr esis and Platonic
chr esis are taken up in his analysis. Fourth, following Foucault, the author deepens
the Platonic sense of use and its relation to taking care of justice. The article con-
cludes with a critical assessment of Agamben’s reading of Plato’s myth of Er, in which
the motifs of use, exile, and care are gathered.
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The nine volumes of Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer series are orga-
nized in four divisions. The fourth and last division, consisting of the
volumes The Highest Poverty and The Use of Bodies, oﬀer a conclusion to
this series. This conclusion is, ﬁrst and foremost, concerned with develop-
ing a ‘theory of use’ (Agamben, 2013: xiii). The thematic core of this
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division is formed by the concepts of use and form-of-life. Apparently,
the project that departs from the problem of biopolitics and bare life is
completed by a reﬂection on use and form-of-life. While the question of
biopolitics has already been widely researched, the conclusion Agamben
oﬀers to the Homo Sacer series and the sense of the notions of use and
form-of-life are still in need of a proper reception.1 In this paper, I will
critically interpret and assess Agamben’s theory of use and do so by
taking relevant motifs from Foucault’s later work as the horizon for
such an interpretation.
Such a horizon limits my enterprise because Agamben brings many
other references into play to account for use and form-of-life.
Nevertheless, the Foucault-nexus has a privileged place given its central
role throughout the Homo Sacer series. The series begins by rethinking
and redeﬁning Foucault’s idea of biopolitics, and it concludes with an
account of use and form-of-life, which are explicitly introduced as alter-
natives to Foucault’s later explorations of care and the art of living.
In relation to the fourth division of the Homo Sacer series, it is important
to note the following three circumstances. First, Foucault (2011: 182)
suggests that the Franciscans, who are at the center stage of The
Highest Poverty, are the Christian heirs of the ancient Cynics, the genu-
ine heroes of Foucault’s The Courage to Truth. Second, the title of the
last volume, The Use of Bodies, alludes to Foucault’s The Use of Pleasure.
Third, Agamben (2015: 31–7) shows how Foucault’s attention to the
ancient philosophical theme of the care of the self is grounded in the
notion of use (chr esis) in The Hermeneutics of the Subject (see Foucault,
2005: 56–7).
Taking these three elements into account, this article is organized as
follows. First, I describe how the original problem of bare life is taken up
in The Use of Bodies and how the notion of use oﬀers an important
additional characteristic of bare life. Second, I discuss in which sense
the type of solution Agamben oﬀers to the problem of bare life is
Cynic in character; I illustrate this in reference to both form-of-life and
exile. Third, I critically assess the diﬀerent usages of use that we can
ﬁnd in Agamben, by comparing how Franciscan usus, Pauline chr esis
and Platonic chr esis are taken up in his analysis. Fourth, following
Foucault (2015: 72), I deepen the sense of Platonic chr esis and its relation
to taking care of justice (Plato, 1927: 222–3) in order to prepare my
concluding, critical assessment of Agamben’s reading of Plato’s myth
of Er, gathering the motifs of use, exile, and care.
Effacing the Gap between Z oe and Bios
Homo Sacer famously opens with the argument that the gap between z o e
and bios – or between phusis and nomos – accounts for the production of
bare life. Z o e is natural life and belongs to phusis. Bios refers to a form of
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life, that is, to the art of living of a particular group of people or of an
individual; thus, it concerns the social, conventional ways of living
adopted by communities or individuals and belongs to nomos, meaning
custom or convention as well as law (Agamben, 1998: 3).2 Hence, the
notion of a form of life appears in the Homo Sacer series from the outset,
as the very sense of bios and nomos. The hyphenation form-of-life, which
appears in the conclusion of the series, aims to retain this sense of bios,
but in such a way that it is no longer separated from z o e. This, in fact, is
the very ‘wager’ of the fourth division:
The wager here is that there can be a bios, a mode of life, that is
deﬁned solely by means of its special and inseparable union with zoe`
and has no other content than the latter (and, reciprocally, that
there is a zoe` that is nothing other than its form, its bios).
Precisely and solely to the bios and zoe` thus transﬁgured do there
belong the attributes of political life: happiness and autarchy, which
in the classical tradition were instead founded on the separation of
bios and zoe`. One has a political bios who never has his zoe` as a part,
as something separable (that is, as bare life), but is his zoe`, is com-
pletely form-of-life. (Agamben, 2015: 219)
As bare life is produced from the gap between phusis and nomos,
the form-of-life aims to overcome this problem since it concerns ‘a life
that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never
possible to isolate and keep distinct something like a bare life’
(Agamben, 2015: 207).
As the longer quotation informs us, Agamben’s wager ultimately con-
cerns a diﬀerent placement of political happiness and autarchy, namely
one that no longer depends on bare life. To explicate what this means,
I address the following two questions. Why do happiness and autarchy in
ancient thought depend on the separation of bios and z o e? How is bare
life produced from the gap of phusis and nomos? The ﬁrst question has to
wait until the next section. As for the second question, we know from
Homo Sacer that its answer must contain a reference to the ban: bare life
is excluded from the nomos but remains related to the nomos from which
it is banned. The Use of Bodies redescribes this exceptional relation in
terms of use, which allows us to get a better sense of the production
of bare life.
In general, for the ancients, nomos is human because human existence
includes a higher calling than the merely natural. Human existence is not
only naturally given as animal life but is also assigned as a task: to exist
humanly is to live life according to a certain form of life. In the
Aristotelian paradigm, which is Agamben’s main reference in this con-
text, practicing such a form of life completes natural life into a fully
human and good life. Therefore, in the political sphere, Aristotle repeats
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the aforementioned distinctions between natural life and good life
(Agamben, 1998: 4). Humans are motivated to constitute a polis because
it helps them to survive and maintain their natural life: the polis is self-
suﬃcient (autarkeias). Yet, this motivation is not the goal of the polis: by
securing mere life (tou z en), the polis opens up the possibility for humans
to attain the good life (tou eu z en), which is the fulﬁlment of political life
(Aristotle, 1932: 8–9).
This particular distinction between phusis and nomos gives rise to the
phenomenon of bare life. To show this, Agamben (2015: 3–23) analyzes
Aristotle’s account of the slave. To illustrate the omnipresence of the
logic Agamben discovers here, let me oﬀer another, seemingly more inno-
cent example. For Aristotle (1933: 6–9), philosophical contemplation is
the highest possibility of human life and the philosophical life is therefore
the highest and truly free form of life: contemplation is done for its own
sake alone. Yet, such a mode of life is only possible after the basic
necessities of life are taken care of and when some people are exempt
from taking care of these necessities: the time of the latter is genuine
schol e, leisure. This happened for the ﬁrst time in Egypt, as Aristotle
suggests: the priestly caste was set free from the care for mere life in
order to devote themselves to the mathematical sciences. Hence, the
highest form of life is only available to an exclusive group, the caste of
priests, who are at leisure thanks to the work of others. This displays
Agamben’s logic of bare life in a nutshell: those who care for mere life are
excluded from the good life of contemplation; yet, their lives are neces-
sary and indispensable to oﬀer the priestly caste the possibility to practice
the highest and genuinely free form of life.
‘Use’ now names the particular relation of the good life to the (bare)
life it requires: the lives of the non-priests are used by the priestly caste so
that they can live the highest, free life, but the non-priests are excluded
from this form of life (Agamben, 2015: 2–23). Clearly, this use of bare life
is not the use that Agamben concludes his Homo Sacer series with.
Rather, to anticipate the line of argument that I will develop below, it
is better to speak here of an abuse of life, and it seems to make sense to
describe the wager of The Use of Bodies exactly in these terms: how to
distinguish use from abuse of life. In the Aristotelian paradigm, the
phusis-nomos distinction leads to an abuse of life: it requires the exclusion
of humans from the good life because some lives are needed to serve as
means for other lives to be able to attain the good life. In response,
Agamben does not claim that we can live without using each other’s
lives or bodies – we continuously do so and need to do so – but he
rather raises the question of how to think such a use without any exclu-
sion of lives from the good life or, what amounts to the same, without
reducing human lives to mere means.
To develop a sense of what Agamben’s analysis aims at, let me provide
a guiding example for the distinction of use and abuse. It is important to
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note that I aim to show below in which sense Agamben is not fully true to
the particular sense of use and abuse this example oﬀers. When I work, I
use my body. As long as I am healthy, this usage is not abusive. In fact,
work usually contributes to the health of my body – a body which is
always at rest will decay. Hence, while I use my body when I work, my
body also uses this work to attain its own good, namely health. Yet,
when I get sick, when I am too tired, or when my work is too stressful
and demanding for my body, but I still continue my work, I’m abusing
my body. Other basic Agambenian notions appear naturally at the hori-
zon of this abuse. When I persevere in this abuse and stretch my body
beyond what it can take, it will suﬀer a breakdown and I will have to
confront its inoperosita`, its sheer inaction or idleness. It is not that my
body does not want to obey my tyrannical commands to work – it is not
a matter of the will – but it simply cannot; it can no longer work (see
Agamben, 2011: 43–5). Using my body only as an instrument, and not as
what can and needs to ﬂourish itself, will ultimately lead to its deactiva-
tion. In more positive terms, when I use my body as an instrument, this
body is marked by the fact that it can also not work, that it does not
coincide with this (ab)use. Inoperosita` thus also concerns a destituzione, a
term which does not exactly mean destitution, as the English translation
suggests, but rather expresses someone’s removal from oﬃce (Agamben,
2015: 264–79). When I use my body by abusing it, I have to be removed
from the oﬃce of (ab)user so that my body is freed for its own ﬂourish-
ing. In its idleness, the body attests that it is not merely means, but lives
for its own sake and has its own good, namely the ﬂourishing to which it
strives. Thus, use and abuse are not exactly opposites, but abuse is rather
a form of immoderate, one-sided, or unnatural use.
Cynic Life in Exile
The Aristotelian paradigm thus guides Agamben’s account of the separ-
ation between phusis and nomos that permeates ancient thought and
binds the ideas of happiness and autarchy. Yet, is this separation char-
acteristic of all ancient schools? With respect to this line of examination,
Foucault’s analysis of ancient Cynicism in The Courage to Truth oﬀers an
important insight. Foucault (2011: 218) notices that, like the other
ancient schools, the Cynics were ﬁrstly concerned with teaching a par-
ticular mode of life, the true life, which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
modes of life adopted by other members of the polis. Thus, in general,
the form of life proclaimed by the philosophical schools was a critique of
the ‘normal’ way of living and one of the ﬁrst tasks of the exercises
(ask esis) the schools oﬀered was to lose the habits of this normal form
of life, that is, to deactivate the normal form of life and train to acquire
fundamentally new habits, completely transforming one’s mode of life.
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Yet, among the ancients, the Cynics stand out because the form of life
they propose is not simply on the side of a particular nomos. In this sense,
the Cynics are exempt from the Aristotelian paradigm that depends on
the separation between phusis and nomos and, consequently, they pro-
pose another sense of politics, happiness, and autarchy. While the
Aristotelian paradigm invites us to a higher form of life – bios, belonging
to a certain nomos – that completes the natural life, the Cynics in fact
object to the very sense of nomos: they do not aim to deactivate a par-
ticular social convention, but rather the very idea of nomos or social
convention itself. Here, to use Agamben’s terminology, we confront a
destituzione: nomos itself is removed from its role to guide humans from
attaining their highest form of life. The Delphic saying that oriented
Diogenes’s form of life reﬂects this: paracharattein to nomisma, to
deface or devalue the coin (Diogenes Laertius, 1925: 22–3). Based on
the connection between nomisma and nomos – also, money is a social
convention – this was interpreted to mean that the Cynic life should be
devoted to devaluing all social values and thus depose nomos from its
position of guiding humans to the good life (Desmond, 2006: 125; more
generally chs 2 and 3).
Indeed, as Foucault (2011: 226–7) suggests, rather than proposing
another nomos, the Cynic practice is concerned with dismantling the
nomos-phusis distinction as such and proposes a true life that can only
be found in natural life itself. The image of defacing the coin says it all: to
remove the face from a coin means to remove the object from the circu-
lation of currency and reduce it to its original physical state so that it is
only a piece of gold or silver and its value only consists in being this.
For the Cynics, natural life is not in need of a completion because it is in
itself complete and we can live our lives in accordance with that which
nature oﬀers – the natural life is itself the content of the true life.
Although the Cynics do not play a central role in Agamben’s analyses,
this description of the Cynic enterprise comes in close proximity to
Agamben’s. In fact, it seems that in ancient thought the Cynic mode of
life is concerned with deactivating the very distinction that, in Agamben’s
thought, forms the basis of the production of bare life. This can be fur-
ther illustrated by the Cynic understanding of exile (phug e) and the self-
description of the Cynic as exile (phugas).
The detachment from social conventions is also detachment of the
social and political community, that is, it is an exile. Note that the
image of the exile is a commonplace in ancient thought to depict the
philosopher. It illustrates that philosophers no longer feel at home in
their polis and that they need to adopt a place outside of the polis to
actually become a philosopher.3 This is closely connected with the phil-
osophers’ emphasis on adopting another form of life: if one feels the need
to adopt another form of life than the one that one is used to, it means
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that one no longer feels familiar or comfortable with the mode of life
adopted by the ones in their social environment.
When referring to this general image for the philosopher, Agamben
connects the problem of philosophical exile to the overcoming of the
problem of the ban that marks bare life:
The relation of the ban in which bare life is held, which we have
identiﬁed in Homo Sacer I as the fundamental political relationship,
is laid claim to and assumed as his own by the philosopher. But in
this gesture, it is transformed and inverted into something positive,
having been posed as a ﬁgure of a new and happy intimacy, of an
‘alone by oneself’ as a cipher of a superior politics. Exile from pol-
itics cedes its place to a politics of exile. (Agamben, 2015: 236)
In this analysis on phug e, Agamben (2015: 234–9) thus distinguishes
between the miserable ban in which bare life ﬁnds itself and the happy
exile of the philosopher. The ban is miserable because it concerns a mere
exile from the polis in which the banned life still depends on the polis’
sense of the good life; therefore, this banned life is not capable of and has
no access to the good life. The philosopher’s happy exile, by contrast,
concerns another politics and another polis, namely a politics and a polis
of exile, which no longer depends on the polis from which it is exiled for
its good life. Hence, this politics of exile truly breaks the ban and severs
all ties to the polis from which the philosopher is exiled.
If this interpretation of Agamben’s remarks makes sense, it is not clear
how he can deduce this from the ancient philosophical image of exile in
general. In fact, as the example from Aristotle’s Metaphysics has shown,
the actual polis is the social condition of possibility for the philosophical
life according to Aristotle – and while this philosophical life might be
very happy alone with itself, it is only possible on the basis of banning
and using the bare lives of those who provide the conditions of possibility
for these happy few. In particular, this means that the philosophical life
according to Aristotle is not autarchic, from Agamben’s perspective: it
depends on bare life. As soon as the slaves revolt, the possibility of this
form of the Aristotelian good life disappears from the polis. In this sense,
it is neither autarchic nor sustainable.
Agamben’s interpretation of the philosopher as exile does make sense,
though, if we add the hypothesis that he actually refers to the Cynic
version of this image. Because the Cynic form of life deposed the
nomos itself, the Cynic exile is no longer in a relation of a ban to this
polis. Indeed, in Cynicism a genuine new sense of politics and polis arises
based on this exile. This polis is no longer social or conventional,
but rather concerns nature or the world (kosmos) itself. The Cynics
were the ﬁrst to refer to themselves as kosmopolit es, citizens of the
world (Diogenes Laertius, 1925: 64–5). Rather than depending on the
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autarkeia of the polis, the Cynics famously claim that life according to
nature grants us a much higher independence and self-suﬃciency
(Dio Chrysostom, 1932: 249–83). Therefore, as Foucault notes, the aut-
archy of Diogenes surpasses that of Alexander the Great: ‘Alexander’s
monarchy is therefore quite fragile and precarious, since it depends on
something else. That of Diogenes, on the other hand, is unshakeable and
cannot be overturned, since he needs nothing to exercise it’ (Foucault,
2011: 276). The autarchy in which Cynicism prides itself borrows nothing
from nomos and only depends on phusis, natural life. A Cynic version of
the argument against the phusis-nomos distinction would thus not only
point to the miserable status of bare life, but also to the lack of self-
suﬃciency of those who are capable of living the good life in the polis.4
Although the Cynic’s natural life is marked by poverty (aporia), frugality
(euteleia), toil (ponos), and exercise (ask esis), it is – according to the
famous reversal characteristic of Cynic rhetoric and life – richer than
the lives of the wealthiest rulers.
Franciscan, Pauline, and Foucauldian Use
Let us now turn to the other basic notion of Agamben’s theory of use,
namely that of use itself. While the Cynics are remarkably absent from
The Use of Bodies – they only appear in reference to Foucault (Agamben,
2015: 102–3, 145) – their Christian heirs, the Franciscans and their usus
pauper, are at the center stage of The Highest Poverty. This volume adds
another stage to Agamben’s archeology of the phusis-nomos distinction in
Western culture: in the reﬂections on monastic life in general and the
Franciscans in particular, it appears in the form of the vita-regula
distinction (Agamben, 2013: 106). According to Agamben (2013: xi,
101), the Franciscan formula regula et vita and comparable formulas
such as forma vitae – form of life – point to a third alternative in
which the two opposing notions of life and rule or form have become
indistinguishable; the ‘task’ of The Highest Poverty is ‘to bring this third
thing to light’. In the case of the Franciscans, the indiﬀerence of form and
life is understood as follows: ‘The form is not a norm imposed on life, but
a living that in following the life of Christ gives itself and makes itself a
form’ (Agamben, 2013: 105). When the norm or nomos is separated from
life or phusis, it becomes external to it and is imposed on it. It is exactly
this externality Agamben wishes to overcome with his reference to this
‘third thing’. He does not state that life has no form or rule, but he does
deny that forms and rules can be separated from the speciﬁc life to which
they belong as independent entities that subsequently can be ﬁxed, iden-
tiﬁed, and imposed on life. Bare life is exactly that which remains after
subtracting its form and is, subsequently, considered to be the basic bio-
matter that can be formed by any external form. When Agamben speaks
of an original indiﬀerence of form and life, he means that a form is not a
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norm originally external to life; rather, it is the form that a life acquires
by practicing a certain way of life. In the case of the Franciscans, the life
that it practices is that of Christ.
For the Franciscans, as Agamben (2013: 71) argues, the form-of-life
hinted at as the ‘third thing’ is determined as usus. Ultimately, this use is
exempliﬁed by the notion of usus pauper, the restricted or ‘poor’ use of
goods allowed to the Friars Minor, although they have no right to it.
Agamben (2013: 116) shows how in the theological and philosophical
medieval discussions, this usus pauper is grounded in a natural right:
humans can use that which they have no right to use, if they need
these goods for their physical survival. In light of the distinction between
the miserable ban and the philosopher’s happy exile, it will come as no
surprise that Agamben (2013: 110) considers the Franciscan conception
of usus pauper a failure because, although it aims to establish ‘the pos-
sibility of a human existence beyond the law’, it maintains the usus pauper
in relation to the law. Hence, the human existence beyond the law
proposed by the Franciscans does not truly sever its relation to the law
and thus remains in the relation of the ban.
This dismissal of the Franciscan usus pauper remains rather formal
and is discussed quite extensively in the available literature (DeCaroli,
2016; Vatter, 2016). Yet, when contrasted to Cynic poverty, another,
more substantial reason can be given why the Franciscan enterprise
must be problematic for Agamben – and why, in a sense, this enterprise
actually explodes the phusis-nomos framework Agamben imposes on the
issue of bare life. Franciscan life exempt from the law is, like Cynic life,
based on poverty. However, the Franciscan poverty is not that of nature,
but that of Christ. The Cynics emphasize the true wealth and resources
oﬀered freely by nature and the genuine autarchy nature oﬀers; the
Franciscans, however, adopt a diﬀerent model of poverty. The suﬀering
and hardship that come with this poverty is not simply that of a frugal
life that still enjoys the gifts of nature, but is understood in terms of the
cross of Christ (Agamben, 2013: 106). With this latter emphasis, the
Franciscans embrace a form of life marked by misery. Death on the
cross was never simply a death penalty, but it was a punishment for
slaves. As Cicero indicated, the cross represents the utmost scandal
and disgrace; therefore, a Roman citizen should not even allow the
thought of the cross in his mind, in his eyes or in his ears (Cicero,
1927: 466–9).
The scandalous life of the Cynics is one that basically embraced every-
thing natural (Foucault, 2011: 181–6). By its emphasis on the cross, the
scandalous life adopted by the Franciscans incorporates a clear sense of
bare life. Hence, rather than overcoming bare life, the model of the Friars
Minor, in fact, retains it at its heart. At the same time, however, the
Franciscan form-of-life is not simply the product of a political interplay
between z o e and bios, but concerns rather a Christian ontology of life
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itself – reminiscent of the one portrayed by Saint Paul when he writes
that ‘creation itself’ is in ‘a bondage to decay’ and ‘that the whole cre-
ation has been groaning in pains of labor’ (Romans 8:21–22). Here, nat-
ural life appears neither as a resource rich enough for a good life nor as
self-suﬃcient. In fact, it lacks the basic capacity of truly being lived for its
own sake. The Franciscan poverty reaches so deep that it cannot even
consider natural life and nature itself as self-suﬃcient. Consequently, if
this Franciscan life in accordance with the highest poverty – that is, the
cross of Christ – can be called ‘bare life’, this bare life cannot be deter-
mined as the product of the separation of phusis and nomos; it rather
concerns a bareness and miserableness at the heart of nature or life itself,
beyond the conﬁnes of Agamben’s and the Cynic appreciation of the
wealth of nature.
Moreover, there is another problem related to the connection of pov-
erty and use. Agamben introduces use in opposition to property and
related terms such as appropriation, owning, ownership, and possession.
The ﬁrst time Agamben refers to use and chr esis is in his reading of Saint
Paul. There, indeed, he interprets chr esis in opposition to possession:
Use: this is the deﬁnition Paul gives to messianic life in the form
of the as not. To live messianically means ‘to use’ kl esis; conversely,
messianic kl esis is something to use, not to possess. (Agamben,
2005: 26)5
This quote refers to 1 Corinthians 7 in which Paul discusses how the
messianic vocation – kl esis is vocation or calling – revokes all previous
worldly vocations. To revoke is not to annihilate vocations, but allows
people to live their vocations diﬀerently. To describe this new way of
living, Paul uses the expression h os m e, ‘as not’, which plays a crucial role
in Agamben’s reading (2005: 23–7), exemplifying a messianic mode of life
that no longer identiﬁes with a vocation but rather uses it.
However, in contrast to Agamben’s reading, when considering Paul’s
h os m e-formulas, they do not exactly oppose possession and use. Paul
oﬀers two consecutive ‘as not’ formulas (in a total of ﬁve of them) in
which possession and use appear, respectively, but there is no intrinsic
connection: ‘and they that buy, as though they possessed not. And they
that use (chr omenoi) this world, as not abusing (katachr omenoi) it . . .’
(1 Corinthians 7:30–31). The actual tension in the ﬁnal h os m e formula is
not between possession and use, but rather between use and abuse,
misuse, or using up (as in the French usure: a use to the extreme that
leads to wastage or wears out). Paul’s statement on buying does not
argue that we cannot do business – agorazontes – or own things.
Rather, he points out that there resides an abuse in doing business if
we do it for the sake of possessing alone, that is to say, if we are possessed
by the will to possess.
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So, indeed, use is, for Paul, the category to apply to doing business,
but the same applies to having a wife, rejoicing, and weeping (1 Cor.
7:29–31) – doing business does not have any privileged place among the
other examples: in each case, it is a matter of avoiding abuse. Hence, the
latter ‘as not’ formula summarizes and captures the sense of the ones
preceding it: use as not abusing, misusing or using up. Thus, this formula
says that every use harbors the possibility of abuse, which we need to
take care of and need to avoid; hence, the phrase: ‘to use as not abusing,
misusing or using up’.
In sum, Agamben’s proposal (2005: 26) to read the h os m e formula in a
positive sense as ‘use’ oﬀers a crucial insight, but less so when he reads it
in opposition to possession: it should simply be read as ‘to use as not
abusing’.6 The strict opposition to possession only makes sense from a
Cynic perspective in which possession and money are hallmarks of nomos
in its opposition to phusis. Such a perspective, however, is not exactly
Paul’s. By this misreading, Agamben runs the risk of not recognizing that
Paul speaks here of the intrinsic possibility of abuse in every use. To see
how and where this might happen, let us turn to Foucault’s account
of chr esis.
The recognition of the possibility of abuse at the heart of every use is
not only a matter of Paul’s 1 Corinthians 7. For Foucault (1990: 33–77)
also, the ancient philosophical question raised under the heading of
chr esis in the Greek expression chr esis aphrodisi on, the use of pleasure,
does not concern ownership. It rather concerns the question of how to
use sexual desire, which is naturally given but which by its speciﬁc nature
may lead to abuse. To be precise, natural desire itself is not abuse: it has
nothing to do with Christian sin. However, when natural desire is used
immoderately or excessively, the natural desire is abused.7 Therefore, the
ancients urge to respect the ‘internal limit’ (Foucault, 1990: 56) of sexual
desire and not use it beyond, for instance, the satisfaction of its natural
need. To practice s ophrosun e – moderation as well as soundness of mind
– is thus for the ancients not simply a way of using one’s desire, but of
soundly using it, that is, of using as not abusing it. With respect to the
danger of abuse, another urgent need arises: to aim for enkrateia, self-
mastery, so that humans do not become slaves to their natural desires
(Foucault, 1990: 80). Thus, we encounter the same motif as in Paul’s 1
Corinthians 7: to abuse sexual pleasure is actually to be a slave to sexual
desire, just as to abuse doing business or owning things is to become
possessed by one’s desire to possess.
This allows us to explicate a risk in Agamben’s opposition of use and
possession. For Agamben, the ﬁgure of the master is the ﬁgure of the
owner and of the one who commands from the outside. Therefore, for
him, the ﬁgure of the master who owns the slave represents the basic
form of abuse he acknowledges and problematizes. However, as
Foucault’s analysis of enkrateia shows, the ancient philosophers insist
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on the importance of self-mastery to avoid enslavement. Hence, mastery
has a positive sense here and refers to a proper use. Consequently,
it becomes clear how Agamben runs the risk of missing the genuine
position and stakes of the ﬁgures of master and slave in the particular
context of use: as Foucault and Paul show, they serve to illustrate the
diﬀerence between use and abuse. Abuse means to be enslaved and incap-
able of diﬀerentiation between use and abuse.8
Defending Agamben’s resistance against the ﬁgure of command and
mastery, one might argue that while humans may think themselves
in control of their desires, these desires can still overwhelm them. That
is, one could object that there remains something ‘ungovernable’ or
‘inappropriable’ in relation to these desires: the possibility of abuse is,
ultimately, ungovernable and that, for that reason, the image of mastery
and command is out of place in relation to this possibility of abuse that
inhabits all use. Yet, such a defense goes awry by opposing mastery to the
‘inappropriable’. Children who struggle to learn a language slowly start
to master it, but this does not mean that they will ever fully possess it; in
fact, if they grow up to be a novelist or poet, superbly mastering their
language, they will again and again experience that they never own this
language. Yet, their continuous exercise counts as mastery in the ancient
sense of the word. Self-mastery and moderation do not concern a state of
aﬀairs, but rather refer to a practice or exercise (ask esis) in which mastery
and moderation are realized in the ﬁrst place and in which the sense of
the inappropriable only grows. Thus, self-mastery and moderation are
not norms imposed from the outside, but are acquired by living accord-
ingly, guided by the adage ‘using as not abusing’.
Taking Care of Justice
Let me add one more distinction. In general, the use of one’s world, one’s
body, one’s desire, one’s language, and so on, has a deﬁnite priority over
any form of mastery. After all, before novelists master a language, they
simply use it and get acquainted with what it can do, and before athletes
or dancers are in full control of their body, they simply use it in a par-
ticular kind of familiarity and intimacy with it, becoming more and more
familiar with what it can and cannot do, what it needs and does not need,
and so on (see Agamben, 2015: 52). With respect to these examples it
makes sense to distinguish a sense of primordial use from any form of
mastery or being in control. In the ﬁrst part of The Use of Bodies,
Agamben hints at exactly such a primordial sense of use, which is a
complex of being-aﬀected to-and-fro: by use, the user aﬀects what is
used, but, in turn, what is used aﬀects the user and, moreover, the user
is aware of this being-aﬀected and, hence, use constitutes a self-relation
for the user.9 This is why Agamben (2015: 29) suggests deﬁning the Greek
verb chr esthai as follows: ‘[chr esthai] expresses the relation that one has
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with oneself, the aﬀection that one receives insofar as one is in relation
with a determinate being’.
In order not to reduce this primordial use to the acts and activity of a
subject in full control, Agamben opposes this primordial sense of use to
possession and ownership. However, he does not consider the other pos-
sibility, namely that in certain uses, the user is in fact enslaved by the
thing used. Thus, what lacks distinction in his account of primordial use
is that the complex of being-aﬀected to-and-fro can also be a form of
abuse. It is the experience of this possibility that leads Paul to emphasize
not simply a primordial use when he introduces chr esis, but rather to
emphasize that one should take care of the original diﬀerentiation
between use and abuse that inhabits this primordial use, that is to say,
to take care to use as not abusing. The ancient philosophical emphasis on
exercise and acquiring mastery derives from the same experience that an
original diﬀerence permeates any primordial use.
This issue culminates in Agamben’s discussion of Foucault’s reading
of Plato’s Alcibiades. Agamben (2015: 31–7) notes that Foucault (2005:
54–7) refers to chr esis to introduce the question of the subject as the
question of who it is that uses the body. For Socrates, it must be the
soul that uses the body (Plato, 1927: 198–9). As Foucault (2005: 56–7)
writes, Plato discovers here ‘the subject’s singular, transcendent position,
as it were, with regard to what surrounds him, to the objects available to
him, but also to other people with whom he has a relationship, to his
body itself, and ﬁnally to himself’. Foucault’s discovery that the soul is
placed here in the position of the subject that is called on to take care of
itself is crucial here. Foucault’s conclusion (2005: 72) that this care ultim-
ately means ‘to care about justice’, as Alcibiades notes, shows that the
question of use is ultimately about the distinction between use and abuse:
it is the possibility of abuse – and not simply of possession or ownership –
that demands the care for justice. That is to say, it concerns the enact-
ment of the primordial use of the body, of language, of instruments, and
so on, in a particular way: using as not abusing.
Agamben (2015: 33), however, worries that exactly at this point
Foucault’s understanding of chr esis ‘is resolved . . . into that of the com-
mand (arche`) of the soul over the body’. Again, he fears that the soul, as
the commander, becomes the external norm of the body. Yet, for neither
Foucault nor Plato is this the issue. In fact, Agamben omits that the
urgent need for exercise and mastery arises from the possibility of
abuse and injustice that resides in the body as ungovernable and inap-
propriable. Hence, in the Alcibiades, the quest for command is not simply
the quest of someone who is afraid to let go and wants to stay in control,
but is rather a quest for the sake of justice.
Thus, we stumble upon a diﬀerence between a Platonic approach, here
explored by Foucault, and Agamben’s. For Agamben (2015: 234–9), the
primordial use is in itself a resource of the good life; therefore,
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a withdrawal into the ‘intimacy’ of this realm is enough as a politics of
exile. Every invocation of a norm, a command or a master, Agamben
fears, is to impose an external form on this primordial, intimate move-
ment of life. Therefore, the philosophical exile has to separate itself from
norm, command, and mastery into the intimacy of this primordial move-
ment of life. The Socratic question of care, however, arises when we
experience that the primordial use is both a resource of good and evil.
This is why this primordial use requires the exercise of the care for justice;
that is, it requires the human to become a subject that uses as not abusing.
From Bare Life to the Bare Soul
Despite the questions Agamben raises with respect to Plato’s emphasis
on care, the last chapter of The Use of Bodies is concerned with Plato’s
myth of Er. For Agamben (2015: 250), this myth concerns the souls’
choice of a new form of life, a bios, granted to them in their next life.
The realm in which this choice occurs, one might add to Agamben’s
analysis, is a place of a particular exile: the soul has left not only the
polis in which it used to live, but also its intimacy with its body, its habits,
customs, and so on. Since the myth stems from The Republic, could we
not say that it oﬀers its own politics of exile? In line with the distinction
Foucault (2005: 73) proposes, we do not encounter a soul-substance in
this remarkable polis of souls left to their own devices, but rather a soul-
subject forced to make a choice and carry the responsibility for the next
life.10 In the passages Agamben underlines, the soul is thrown back on
this isolated subject position, exempt from substance: the fact that the
souls have to choose implies that there is no substantial connection
between the soul and its life.11 Yet, this lack makes the sight that Er’s
testimony oﬀers both pitiful and ridiculous because many souls lack the
means to make a good choice (Agamben, 2015: 251).
While brieﬂy entertaining the idea that the myth only oﬀers the scene
of a blind choice and thus a blind necessity, leaving no room for any just
choice, Agamben (2015: 257–8) ultimately suggests that the myth still
oﬀers the possibility of choosing a ‘mean bios’. As he explains: ‘to
choose the mean does not mean to choose a bios but, in the bios that it
has befallen us to choose, to be in a position to neutralize and ﬂee the
extremes through virtue’ (2015: 259). Thus, like Foucault, Agamben now
emphasizes the importance of s ophrosun e. Yet, the distinction he pro-
poses between the choice and the use of a form of life is not convincing.
In the myth, the soul’s choice is fundamentally aﬀected by its past bios:
the souls who did not practice moderation during their lifetime are incap-
able of choosing moderately in the topos daimonios; by their abuse and
immoderation during their lifetime, these souls have become contami-
nated by this immoderation – they are possessed by immoderation when
they are forced to choose another life.
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In Plato’s vocabulary (1921: 340–1), separation is not only described in
terms of phug e, exile, but also in terms of gumnos, naked. In the Sophist,
gumnos describes a state of being banned from the sphere to which some-
thing or someone normally belongs – the polismight be one example, and
so is the body. In the Gorgias and the Cratylus, gumnos is used in exactly
this way: Plato (1927: 70–1) speaks of the bare soul, that is, the soul
stripped bare (gumno o) from the body and from its living conditions.
Here, the bare soul is neither simply the immortal soul-substance nor
simply the soul-subject that uses the body, its political environment, or
other living condition. Instead, it concerns the soul’s bare existence set
apart from all that is normally attached to it. Rather than oﬀering a
spectacle of the soul’s very own, immortal wealth, the myths on the
bare soul, such as that of Er, tell the tale of the soul left to its own
poverty and misery. For instance, of one of the souls who make a terrible
choice, it is said that he ‘lived his previous life under an orderly consti-
tution, where he had participated in virtue through habit and without
philosophy’ (Cooper, 1997: 1221–2). In the topos daimonios, neither
nomos nor habitual use or virtue can save the bare soul. However, the
soul is not in a completely desolate state – at least, if it practiced the care
for justice during lifetime: left to its own devices, the soul maintains
the results of this care and does not choose blindly.
Let us recall Agamben’s deﬁnition of chr esthai as ‘the relation that one
has with oneself, the aﬀection that one receives insofar as one is in rela-
tion with a determinate being’ (2015: 29). To be aﬀected in this way
happens always, in every use, and in every abuse. Yet, the experience
of a diﬀerence between use and abuse, misuse or using up gives rise to a
particular task, namely to take care of the soul, which is to take care of
justice. The question of mastery is thus not opposed to use, but is rather
the very task for which we are placed confronted with the experience of
primordial use and the ambiguous ways it aﬀects humans.
The Cynic overtones of Agamben’s project are diﬃcult to miss, as I
have argued. For Agamben, there are two exiles: bare life, banned from
the polis and the good life it oﬀers, is distinguished from the philoso-
pher’s happy exile that severs all ties to the polis and its nomos in order to
achieve authentic autarchy and a return to a sheer, primordial use, which
is in itself the resource of the good life. In Plato, however, we encounter a
diﬀerent politics of exile, marked by another diﬀerence. In Plato’s exile,
all souls ﬁnd themselves equally stripped bare of everything that sup-
ported them during lifetime, whether it be their beauty, their power, their
wealth, or the orderly constitution they inhabited. In this exile, all souls
have severed all ties to the polis and its nomos. Yet, there is still a diﬀer-
ence that runs through these bare souls and their poverty, namely the
diﬀerence between those who cared for justice and those who did not,
between those who exercised and examined the diﬀerence between use
and abuse on the basis of the care for justice – and those who did not.
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Notes
1. The relation of Agamben and Foucault concerning biopolitics has been
extensively researched; see, e.g., De la Durantaye (2009: 207–11), Genel
(2016), Mills (2014: 59–80), Ojakangas (2005), and Thaning, Gudman-
Høyer and Sverre Raffnsøe (2016); for Foucault in The Use of Bodies, see
Lemm (2017); for Foucault in the first volumes of theHomo Sacer series, see
Snoek (2010); for a reception of The Highest Poverty, see Bignall (2016),
DeCaroli (2016), and Vatter (2016).
2. Note that z o e can also be used in the sense of a form of life (see Liddell-
Scott-Jones s.v. z o e); consequently, one may question whether Agamben’s
distinction is as stable as he thinks it is. This has been the object of several
discussions; see, e.g., Derrida (2009: 420–2). I will not go into this debate at
the moment, because it is my first concern to capture the specific nature
of the alternative Agamben aims to offer. My reference to Cynicism in the
rest of the paper clearly shows that the distinction is not encompassing for
ancient thought.
3. As suggested, e.g., by Diogenes (see Diogenes Laertius, 1925: 50–1).
4. Basically, this argument inspires the Cynic rejection of slavery: since
masters depend on slaves, they lack self-sufficiency; see Desmond (2006:
96–8).
5. Later, Agamben (2015: 80–91) also opposes use to possession and relates use
to the inappropriable.
6. In The Use of Bodies, Agamben (2015: 57) argues that the ‘use as not abus-
ing’ refers to the Roman ius utendi et abutendi. Yet, why not limit the appli-
cation of this ius to ‘those who use the world as not abusing’? Then Paul
simply claims that humans do not own the world, i.e. they are not allowed to
fully consume or destroy the world when using it.
7. A similar motif can be found in Foucault, especially in his discussion of
Augustine’s notion of use in relation to marriage (see Foucault, 2018: 369ff).
Augustine adopts a similar sense of a natural use of sexuality from the
ancient thought. Here, I will not discuss the more specific emphases the
early Christian sense of use attains, as Foucault discusses this in relation
to Augustine.
8. Agamben (2015: 66–79) seems to suggest that possession and mastery ultim-
ately lead to use as instrumental use, as in his description of the difference
between the monk and the priest (2013: 84).
9. See, e.g., Agamben’s discussion (2015: 31ff) of the positive sense of the use
of the body, the Stoic oikeiosis, the distinction between use and care, and
‘habitual use’.
10. For Foucault (2005: 72), the soul-subject of the Alcibiades is opposed to the
soul-substance of the Phaedo, which describes the body as the prison of the
soul. Yet, it remains to be seen whether this distinction is stable enough:
imprisonment is another image for enslavement and the body that imprisons
the soul does not allow the soul to care for justice.
11. Agamben (2015: 254) seems to affirm the idea that, in the myth of Er, there
is no soul-substance.
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